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1Farming strategies regarding the production of collective goods in the Russian agricultural 
sector
Grouiez Pascal
*
This article discusses the fact that as Russian farms have been developing multifunctionalities
since 1991 this has to be considered as a twofold strategy: the first goal being expand the 
activities of some institutionally selected enterprises and the second being to reproduce some 
³communities of interests´.  The primary observation highlights a characteristic fact: there 
are several ³non-economic´ functions carried out by farms that depend on their nature (type 
of ownership, size of the farm, etc). This analysis leads to the establishment of a link between 
the very nature of these functions and the existence of constraints and opportunities offered 
by the economic and social environment. Then, the concept of ³productive configuration´ is 
applied to study organization strategies used by several actors in the Orel oblast' and to 
identify four strategies organizing the relationship between food production and collective 
welfare creation, each configuration showing an institutional arrangement to secure the 
continuity and development of farms in a highly competitive context.
Productive Configuration, Mutlfunctionality, Agroholding in Russia
JEL codes: L25, L51, O17, Q13, Q18. 
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of ³corporate social responsibility´ (CSR) is now widespread in economic literature. In 
an article published in 2006, PORTER AND KRAMER demonstrate that prevailing approaches to CSR 
are generally disconnected from the business and strategy of firms. In fact, CSR is mostly 
considered as a cosmetic response when local problems appear, due to the impact of a firm on 
society or its environment. In other words, it is more or less an aggregation of ³anecdotes about 
uncoordinated initiatives to demonstrate a company's social sensitivity´ (PORTER AND KRAMER
2006: 3). As Porter and Kramer did, we have analyzed the social responsibility behavior of firms 
from a more strategic point of view. Within the agricultural sector, another concept enables us to 
achieve this goal: the concept of multifunctionality.
As described below, there are two approaches to the analysis of multifunctionality. The first one is 
used by the OECD (2001) which defines it as the fact that the farms not only produce foodstuffs but 
also produce non-commercial goods, the main characteristic of these goods being that they are 
inseparable from commercial good production, because of the economies of scope. This is why non-
commercial goods production by farms is supported by countries at the WTO to justify subsidies in 
the agricultural sector. With the OECD's definition of multifunctionality, ³non-commercial goods´
seem to be a characteristic of economic activity. The particular characteristic that makes an 
economic activity multifunctional is the multiple nature and interconnections of its outputs and 
effects. 
A second understanding of multifunctionality makes these a much more strategic production. It 
considers the non-commercial output production as an objective assigned to the agricultural sector. 
Then, it becomes necessary to suppose that multiple roles were entrusted to the agricultural sector 
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2and that multifunctionality has value in itself. In this article we will follow this second 
understanding of multifunctionality. 
Yet, in both cases this non-commercial production largely appears as a public policy in support of 
agriculture and not as strategic private initiatives arising from farm management. For instance, 
AMELINA (2000, 2002) considers that the persistence of farms' social responsibility is only due to 
politicians' objective of winning votes. As a consequence, they support corporate farms without any 
economic consideration. In this article we would like to suggest another way to explain the 
maintaining of corporate farms and their socially responsible behavior, a way in which 
multifunctionality appears as a strategy of farms themselves. We believe that it is the same strategy 
that explains and enables the cohabitation of very different types of farms (in terms of size, 
productivity, etc.) within the agricultural sector.
To analyze multifunctionality as strategic farm behavior , we used an "industrial-organization-
wise" approach in which we consider that the actor has a specific rational industry-oriented frame of 
reference. Within it an autonomous actor is able to reach a compromise between his own interests 
and the interests of some other actors in their community. We define a community as an institution 
that stands between individuals and the ³mesosystem´ (DE BANDT 1991) and that encourages group 
members to negotiate and reach a compromise, in order to preserve heritage. Heritage is an asset or 
an institution used to provide and sustain the vitality of a community (POLANYI 1943).  The 
community has an impact on the nature of the supply chain that integrates both questions of the 
marketable goods' ³production´ (commercial relationship) and of the community members' 
³reproduction´ (patrimonial relationship) (rural population, farms of different natures, oligarchs, 
manufacturing firms, etc.). This continuity of the communities can occur through the financing of 
collective goods by the farms. To describe the form taken by this institutional arrangement and its 
consequences on the supply chain management, we will use the terminology of ³productive 
configuration´ which comes from the French régulation theory. A productive configuration is a 
social framework that organizes the coherence of some institutional elements (such as laws, 
political choices, territorial issues, market rules, etc.) with the diversity of interests of actors into a 
community. It is a particular economic system in which capital organizes and expands at a sectoral 
level through production, circulation, consumption, and distribution for a period of time, with some 
degree of stability1. Due to the current period of transition in the Russian agricultural sector, in this 
article we will demonstrate that there is competition between different patterns of ³productive 
configurations´ in the area of the Orel Oblast'. As a result, multifunctionality takes different forms. 
For instance, different productive configurations maintain different types of large corporate farms. 
Some of corporate farms play a social role whereas others do not. With this approach in mind, we 
will demonstrate that the need of providing community vitality prompts authorities to subsidize 
more the farms that also play a social role.
In the first part of this article, we point out that multifunctionality is a characteristic or stylized fact 
of the Russian agricultural sector. We define a stylized fact as a recurrent observation on which the 
analyst focuses to investigate an economic issue. We will see that multifunctionality in Russian 
agriculture takes a form that has never been observed in other countries (particularly in the West). 
Then, we focus on the multifunctionality phenomenon itself to understand why the transition to 
market economy did not lead to corporate farms' bankruptcy as expected but, on the contrary, to the 
diversification of farms types. We assume that this situation is the consequence of some 
compromise that can help us to determine the process of transition and to make prospects on the 
future development of the Russian agricultural sector.
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3In the second section, we demonstrate that, through a stabilized productive configuration,
multifunctionality helps to preserve a community of interest and improve the business activity of 
farms and that the nature of the multifunctionality in the agricultural sector depends, in fact, on the 
nature of the productive configurations that have taken place in each community.  
2. MULTIFUNCTIONALITY OF RUSSIAN FARMS: A STYLIZED FACT REVEALED BY 
BOOKS
2.1. From the concept of CSR to the multifunctionality approach
In 2001, the OECD proposed a multifunctionality analytical framework. According to the OECD, it 
reflected externality and public welfare aspects of the various non-commodity outputs of 
agricultural production. Since then, multifunctionality has been considered as an activity-oriented 
concept that refers to specific properties of the agricultural production process and its multiple 
outputs. The exploration of the supply and demand characteristics for the positive and negative 
outputs of agriculture led the OECD to explore not only agricultural but also non-agricultural ways 
of supplying the non-commodity outputs demanded by society. The framework aimed to define 
when it was economically justifiable to substitute non-agricultural production with agricultural 
production of non-commodity outputs. This important issue aims to determine if some non-
commodity outputs could be supplied at a lower cost by non-agricultural providers. In this context it 
is important to know whether the non-commodity outputs can be separated from agricultural 
production. The answer depends on transaction costs (which include economies of scale) and on the 
fact that some joint outputs exhibit the externality or public good characteristics. In fact, the point 
of view adopted by the OECD was to consider multifunctionality as a characteristic of agricultural 
production which legitimated maintaining some production of non-commodity outputs in the 
agricultural sector. Outputs such as the production of landscape, biological diversity and other 
territorial aspects were directly concerned. The report also stated that it did not take into account 
another aspect of multifunctionality as the OECD (2001: 14) indicated: ³The second way of 
interpreting multifunctionality is in terms of multiple roles assigned to agriculture. In this view, 
agriculture as an activity is entrusted with fulfilling certain functions in society. Consequently, 
multifunctionality is not merely a characteristic of the production process, it takes on a value in 
itself´. In this perspective, multifunctional activity can become a policy or a strategic objective. Our 
analysis will follow this second approach to multifunctionality.
2.2 Multifunctionality as a stylized fact
During the Soviet period, collective farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) acted not only as production 
units but also as social institutions, regulating a significant part of everyday life in the villages. The 
economic and social reforms conducted at the beginning of 90s, aimed at transfering these 
prerogatives to the local administration. The goal was to establish capitalist farms in the post-Soviet 
Russian countryside. Yet, year after year, geographers, political scientists and economists observed 
that this transfer did not succeed. 
We identified three explanations for this situation in economic literature. Most economists put 
forward reasoning that reforms have not been correctly implemented; the consequence being the 
maintaining of barriers to entry that prevent individual farms (considered to be much more efficient) 
from developing (BROOKs and LERMAN 1994a, 1994b, BROOKS et al. 1996, EPSTEIN and SIEMER 
1998, KAMALYAN and al. 1998, LERMAN 1996, 1997, 2001 and SEROVA and SHICK 2005). These 
barriers can originate from: inefficient economic rules,  politicians' choices to protect former 
collective farms from bankruptcy, while in the run for coming elections (AMELINA 2000) and/or 
4from the cultural block of the rural population. Secondly, geographers such as PALLOT and 
NEFEDEVA (2007) support the idea that the preservation of inefficient activities of farmers is linked 
with a rational behavior of the rural population, anticipating the degradation of their conditions of 
life. And a third possible hypothesis is given by political scientists as O'BRIEN and WEGREN (2002), 
WEGREN (2005) who consider that even if traditional social prerogatives of agricultural enterprises 
do not disappear, the farms transformed themselves into more capitalist farms, which are 
underestimated.
While we do note some differences in our own explanation of why farmers have continued to 
provide extended packages of social services, according to most researchers thus far, this role has 
remained after transition. In accordance with the second explanation given, we can consider that 
this role is an aspect of the Russia's agriculture multifunctionality. We must then specify the nature 
of this multifunctionality. 
2.3 Farm multifunctionality characteristics and their economic consequences
Nowadays, one of the most significant specificities of Russian farms is their role in providing social 
services for populations like kolkhozes and sovkhozes did in their time. 
Some researchers consider that it is a remnant of the Soviet period due to political intervention, 
particularly in the case of corporate farms (AMELINA 2000). Yet, the choice of maintaining social 
responsibility is widespread among farmers and does not depend on the size of the farm, which is 
why it needs to be specified for each type of farm. For instance, RYLKO et al. (2008: 99) point out 
the fact that one of the general patterns observed in the emergence of agroholdings in Russia is that 
³some firms have attempted to provide extended packages of social services previously offered by 
collectives´. In the same time, RYLKO et al. (2008) do not consider that these new operators have an 
irrational behavior. The main reason for entering the agricultural sector given by them is their 
attempt to make profit. Neither do O'BRIEN et al. (2004) consider that these objectives collide. In 
their opinion, the search for profit combined with the attempt to provide social services are the 
result of a hybridization process. The farms try to enter the market economy system, but their need 
for political or economical support leads them to reach a compromise between their interest and 
those of the rural population. 
5As far as individual farms are concerned, PALLOT and NEFEDOVA (2003) have demonstrated that 
they also fulfill a social function. For instance, they give a part of their production (mostly 
vegetables) to the rural population, in return for land. Moreover, BOGDANOVSKII (2008) established 
a link between the diminution of employment in the corporate farms and the increase of over-
employment in the individual farms, as we can see on figures 1 and 2.
Fig. 1:  Agricultural labor: corporate and individual farms
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Fig. 2: Agricultural labor productivity: corporate and individual farms
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Source : BOGDANOVSKII (2008 : 238)
Economic literature considers that individual farms are more productive than corporate farms due to 
the absence of economies of scale in the agricultural sector. Analysis of figure 2 shows the opposite 
tendency. In fact average labor productivity in Russia is lower in the individual farms than in 
corporate farms (see LERMAN and SCHREINEMACHERS 2005 ; LIEFERT et al. 2005 ; MACOURS and 
SWINNEN 2005 for similar findings). For BOGDANOVSKII (2005, 2008) this situation is the 
consequence of the absorption of the full impact of the lack of labor component in the individual 
sector. But, BOGDANOVSKII does not explain how individual farms keep their place in the market, 
with such bad levels of labor productivity. SWINNEN et al. (2000) go further and draw a parallel 
between the over-employment phenomenon in individual farms and the decrease in unemployment 
subsidies in various Eastern European countries. Moreover, O'BRIEN et al. (1998) have 
demonstrated that the more the individual farms are able to absorb the impact of the missing labor 
components, the more the corporate farms transfer their employees in the individual sector. When 
this is not the case, the transfer does not happen. There is the relationship between corporate farms 
and individual farms. PALLOT and NEFEDOVA (2007: 205) concluded with these words: ³The strange 
thing is that it precisely this small-scale activity that is guaranteeing the continued existence of the 
former collectivist agricultural enterprises [«]. They explain why collective farms have proved to 
be more stable than economist-reformers had earlier predicted´. 
At the same time, we observed that both individual and corporate farms are multifunctional. 
However, this occurs in different ways that do not have the same economic consequences. 
Corporate farms continue to make profit as well as fulfilling a need for social services whereas 
6multifunctionality has unfavorable consequences on individual farms and their productivity. Yet 
both types of farms remain. We will now study the institutional framework farms have developed to 
ensure their maintaining in a competitive context. We will demonstrate that the form 
multifunctionality takes emerges from compromise between farms and communities. Then we'll 
show how, more than a consequence, multifunctionality can be understood as differentiation or 
complement strategies in the development of farm activities and in the reproduction of communities 
of interests by the means of four different productive configurations.   
3. MULTIFUNCTIONALITY AS FARMERS' STRATEGIES TO DEVELOP ACTIVITIES 
AND TO REPRODUCE COMMUNITIES
We identified four ³productive configurations´ in the régulation of the agricultural sector of the 
Orel oblast'. The first one was developed by the Orel local government and emphasizes the food 
security and the zoning of the region by controlling some corporate farms and some private farmers. 
The second productive configuration was developed by new operators under the control of 
³oligarchs´. In this configuration two elements are linked together: the financing of some collective 
goods (primary schools, housing, etc) by the farmers in return for the favorable regulation of the 
food market by the regional and national authorities. This regulation takes the shape of quotas on 
meat importation or on facility access to credit for the oligarchs in the Orel oblast' against the food-
industry. The third ³productive configuration´ allows the development of two types of farms: 
independent former kolkhozes/sovkhozes and plots of land. In this configuration, the independent 
farms find new outlets into the food-industry and help plots of land to get contracts with industrial 
operators. This type of compromise allows the fundamental needs of the local population to be 
guaranteed. The fourth productive configuration helps expand the activity of private farmers: they 
sign contracts with ³speculant´ (middlemen) to guarantee outlets for their products, avoiding the 
competition with corporate farms and food-industry. This configuration directly depends on the land 
contract that the private farmers sign with collective-land owners. Private farmers provide the 
collective-land owners with inputs for their plots of land in exchange for land rental.
73.1 The regional agroholding
In 1994, the administration of Orel Oblast' created one of the first agroholdings2 in Russia, which 
subsequently disappeared in 2010. However, it is interesting to understand how it was organized.  
Orlovskaâ Niva was structured as a whole supply chain, integrating the entire production chain 
from basic agricultural products to foodstuffs. Therefore the organization integrated different kinds 
of firms, from corporate farms to food processing plants. The official goal of this organization was 
to reduce the bankruptcy risk of ex-kolkhozes and ex-sovkhozes. At the same time, it was playing a 
role in the food security of the region. Indeed, Orlovskaâ Niva used to produce all kind of 
foodstuffs consumed by Orel citizen as fig. 3 shows. 
Fig. 3: Orlovskaâ Niva agro-food industry
Source:  MCX (2001: 22)
                                               
2 Initial analysis of the agroholdings were proposed by RYL'KO and JOLLY (2005). They defined agroholdings as 
commercial  farms controlled by entities whose core business is outside agricultural sector. But WANDEL (2007)
points out the fact that agroholdings can also be under the control of a regional authority. Then, according to the 
definition adopted by authors, agroholding appears more or less efficient (HOCKMAN et al. 2005, 2007). In this 
article we define an agroholding as an organization owned by public or private investors whose core business is 
outside agricultural sector in the aim to integrated farms into a supply chain. That means that the efficient of the 
agroholding as to be evaluated according to this goal. 
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8As we can see in fig. 3, Orlovskaâ Niva also integrated some physical markets to ensure outlets. 
Furthermore, the managers of the agroholding had signed contracts with some owners of household 
plots and some individual farms, as reported by an Orel farmer in one of our interviews. 
I am a grain grower. I signed a contract with the administration 
of the Oblast'. I sell a significant part of my production to 
Orlovskaâ Niva on a price established before the transaction 
takes place. The price is lower than the market price. But the Orel 
administration gave me subsides to build my house. 
For a long time the organization has included some individual farms, which helped processing 
plants secure their inputs. As a consequence, production in Orlovskaâ Niva has been extremely 
diversified. We interpret this diversification of the production as a will of the region's authorities to 
guarantee the typical food commodity basket. This hypothesis is consolidated by the declarations of 
the accountant of Orlovskaâ Niva¶s market hall: 
In Orlovskaâ Niva¶s market hall the delicatessen comes 
essentially from the agroholding's processing plants. On the 
other hand the meat results from contracts signed with 
individual farmers. We can thus buy everything on our market 
but the origin of products is diverse. 
According to this statement Orlovskaâ Niva not only integrated former kolkhozes and sovkhozes 
but also individual farms that supplied it with market garden produce at prices lower than market 
prices. In return, these farmers received subsidies from the public administration to build their 
housing. Orlovskaâ Niva performed a social role, which gave strong reasons for farmers to become 
part of the agroholding. Access to housing appears to be a characteristic of agroholdings' 
multifunctionality. In the case of Orel, this non-market welfare service appears as a mean to secure 
the food supply for the regional agroholding.
As seen in this example, the commercial relationship in which the actors of this productive 
configuration are placed obliges individual farmers to supply foodstuffs at a non-market price 
whereas the patrimonial relationship induces Orlovskaâ Niva to offers access to social goods.
3.2 A productive configuration of "private agroholings"
During our stay in Orel we conducted interviews with managers of Nobel-Ojl, Eksima, Ûnost and 
Moslovo, which are private agroholdings set up in this Oblast'. Interviews enabled us to learn that 
these structures adopted a sectoral integration framework, from agricultural raw materials to the 
retail food market. Their food production is more specialized than the public agroholding's 
production. 
The table 1 below proposes a summary of the private agroholdings listed in the Orel Oblast' in 
2007/2008, according to information gathered from our interviews and from extensive data from the 
agricultural department of the regional administration.
9Table 1: Agroholdings in the Orel Oblast' in 2007/ 2008
Head office of the 
agroholdings Name of the owners
Usable 
farmland 
in ha.
Investment 
in 2007/ 
2008 (Md. 
r.)
Mean 
activity/Activity in 
Orel
Number of 
Corporate 
Farms in 
Orel
OAO Agrofest-Don (OOO 
Agrofest-Orel) 
Aleksej Fedoryþev 
(Dinamo  of Moscow) 31000 0,134 football/grain production 10
Mossel'prom (in 2009) Sergej Lisovsko   n.a. n.a.
Television and press/Pig 
breeding 3
Agroholding (AMS-Agro) ýetverikov 30000 2 Politician/ n/a 9
Belyj Fregat  Anatolij Butorin 100000 1,3
Grain Import /Poultry 
farm 5
ZAO AVK Eksima (Eksima 
Agro) . The shareholder is the 
company  
Soûzagrozagranpostavka Nikolaj Demin 46000 4
Meat international trade  
/Pig breeding 4
Set-Holding (link to ɈȺɈ
"Severnaâ Neft'" bought by  
Rosneft) Aleksandr Samusev 50000 0,004 Oil/grain production 4
Agroteh-M äanna Mahova 8500 1 Oil/Daily cow breeding  3
Nobel-Ojl (Nobel-Agro) Grigorij Gureviþ 90000 0 Oil/grain production 3
OOO Planeta
Perelygin Gennadij 
Leonidoviþ 8800 0,016 n/a /Daily cow breeding 2
Agriko (âablykinskij 
agrokompleks) Vladimir Bovin 6000 4
International Trade of 
Grain/Pig breeding 2
holding ɁȺɈ Orelinvestprom Il'âåov M.A. 40000 6,5
Cement works/Pig 
breeding 2
Avtobaza Il'inskoe V. P. Veǆikov 9500 0,03
Construction firm in 
Moscow/Potato 2
Al'kor Holding grupp AG ±
russo-swiss Bank (Avangard 
Agro-Orel) Vladimir Dåangirov 11200 1 Bank/sunflower oil 1
Prodimeks Holding (bought 
51% of the company 
³Kompaniâ Evroservis´)  
Hudokormov Igor' 
Vâþeslavoviþ chairman 
of the company  
RAZGULÂJ 14400 n.a.
Sugar import  from 
Ukraina/Sugar 
manufacturing 2
Holding Zolotoj Kolos n.a. 2600 0,059
Regional agroholding 
from Tatarstan 1
ɈȺɈ «Agropromyãlennyj 
al'âns Ûg» Isaenko Petr Dmitrieviþ 8000 1,4 n/a / Pig breeding 4
Moslovo
Aleksandr Dragal'cev 
(nephew of the governor 
Stroev) 35000 -
dairy cow breeding and 
market gardening 2
Ûnost'
Sergej Boudagov 
(Brother-in-law of the 
governor Stroev) 2200 - Grain production 1
OOO Omega Kompaniâ
Karmanov Konstantin 
Nikolaeviþ 4300 0,45 Nd./dairy cow breeding 1
Total
41 % of the regional 
usable farmland 487200 22 58
10
The private agroholdings occupy an important land area in the region of Orel. In 2007/2008, private 
agroholdings owned 58 corporate farms, representing approximately 20 % of the total of the 
corporate farms in this region. These 58 corporate farms occupied 41 % of the agricultural land 
area. Moreover, The private agroholdings invested 21,4 billion roubles (approximately 630 million 
euros) in modernizing farms. We chose to describe how one of these agroholdings in particular 
works: Eksima-Agro. 
The economic model of Eksima-Agro
Eksima-Agro is an agroholding owned by Soûzagranpostavka, a company specialized in the 
international meat trade. During the Soviet period this company guaranteed most of the meat 
supplies of the USSR. In 1992, Soûzagranpostavka created Eksima with the aim of pursuing its 
trade activity. This allowed it to take part in the federal initiatives of foodstuff deliveries for the 
needs of the Moscow administration. Eksima works, for this reason, with important Russian banks 
such as Rossel'hozBank, GaspromBank and Sberbank. Also, Eksima bought the most important 
delicatessen plant of Moscow (Mikoân, 20 % of the Moscow delicatessen market) and supplied it 
thanks to its international trade activity. In 2006, Eksima modified its strategy, taking control of four 
corporate farms from Orel Oblast'. These farms are specialized in pig breeding and have allowed 
Eksima to supply its delicatessen plant since then. In 2009, the agroholding encompassed twenty 
corporate farms or factories and about 10 000 employees. The pig population was 70,000 heads. 
The agroholding owned 46,000 hectares (113,700 acres) of land among which 36,000 hectares (89
000 acres) were used to provide feeding for the pig breeding farms. When we asked Natalia 
Viktorovna  (the regional manager of Eksima-Agro) which part of the pig-feed was bought, this is 
the answer she gave: 
We buy 100 % of the feed.
Question: this sounds astonishing to me because most of the pig breeding 
factories I met use their own feed. Why don't you adopt the same policy? 
In fact, we have the same policy: we buy feed from corporate farms which are 
integrated in Eksima-Agro. It is the head office of the agroholding that sets 
the prices. [...] the prices are factually lower than the market prices. Our 
objective is to have control of the supply and of the prices in all the supply 
chain processes.   
The feed production of the corporate farms (which was estimated at 760 million Rubles in 2009 by 
the local manager of Eksima) aims at satisfying feed needs of the agroholding. The manager's 
comment on the feed-price formation proves that the contracts with the corporate farms are not 
contracts signed in a competitive context. These non-market contracts are signed because of the 
integration model developed by the agroholding. Also, if relations between the pig breeding 
factories and the ³Mikoân´ plant can be considered as business connections of independent legal 
entities from a legal point of view, the reality is that they are not market based relations, yet. The 
pig breeding factories sell their meat to a price determined beforehand by Mikoân. The agroholding 
controls all the supply chain prices, from the feed prices to the delicatessen prices. The market is 
pushed to the level of a high value-added end product such as the delicatessen. 
The vertical integration practiced by Eksima is the new organizational shape developed by most of 
the agroholdings we interviewed. It allows costs control over the whole supply chain and 
production system. Moreover, Table 1 (above) reveals that these agroholdings specialize in high 
value-added activities which provide fast ROI. They focus mainly on poultry/pig breeding and feed 
growing activities. The poultry and the pork meat are then pre-packaged in sealed containers before 
being sold in supermarkets. 
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In contrast to the public agroholding, the private agroholdings adopt a commercial trade strategy. 
Nevertheless, these firms supply and\or finance collective goods and welfare for their employees 
and for the inhabitants of the villages. According to data obtained with an agriculture specialized 
economist of the Orel Oblast', in 2008 Eksima spent 75 million Rubles (2.1 million Euros) in 
housing, roads, gas networks and subsidies to public schools and care centers in the Olorvskii rajon. 
In 2006, the company Jupiter (controlled by the OOO Omega Kompaniâ, see Table 1) built houses 
and financed a playing field for the middle school of the village of Zlynski. The firm spent 400,000 
Rubles (10,000 Euros) on the acquisition of computers for the benefit of the same middle school. 
These examples underline that the leaders of agroholdings agree to perform social roles for the 
benefit of the rural population. Two elements encourage them into this initiative: incentives from 
the authorities and the fact that financing collective goods is a means to stimulate the productivity 
of their own employees. This answer by a Moslovo manager (see Table 1) to the question "do you 
use other means to stimulate the level of productivity of your workers?" illustrates this perfectly:
Yes, by providing social insurances, assistants of all kinds, 
which I call the "employee relationship management". I help 
them obtain bank loans for house building. How I assist them is 
determined by their behavior patterns: the best employees get 
the best services. It is a pre-capitalism. 
In this case multifunctionality take a specific form and seems essential to guarantee good everyday 
living conditions, particularly in the countryside where the corporate farms are probably the only 
institutions able to finance such investments (LEFÈVRE 2003). 
3.3 A productive configuration framed by independent corporate farms and actors of the 
Food-processing industry (FPI)
In 2008, thanks to extensive data gathering, we estimated the number of independent corporate 
farms in the Orel Oblast' to be 196, which is approximately 70 % of all the corporate farms in this 
region. We use the terminology of "independent" to qualify corporate farms not having exclusive 
subordinate relationship with public or private agroholdings. As a consequence these farms have to 
find the means for financing their investments and to look for outlets by themselves. They have 
limited access to bank loans, and thus increased difficulty in modernizing their equipment and 
expanding their activities in the value chain. As a result, the independent corporate farms prove to 
be dependent on the food-processing industry.  The productive configuration set up by the 
independent corporate farms revolves around contracts signed with FPI actors. 
A representative case can be found with the company Novosil'skoe in the Orel Oblast'. This 
company has to look for its outlets by itself. In this context, Novosil'skoe signed a contract with a 
dairy factory in Tula, the administrative capital of a neighboring region of Orel. Novosil'skoe sells 
90 % of its milk production to this factory. Moreover, the local household plots benefit from this 
commercial contract because the factory not only collects milk from the corporate farm every 
morning but also the milk produced the household plots. 
This kind of productive configuration has been confirmed by interviews we had with thirty 
managers from the FPI at Prodexpo 2009 (a Moscow agro-industrial fair). This study allowed us to 
note that six FPIs specialized in dairy production got their supplies from independent Russian 
corporate farms. Other FPIs privileged import of foodstuffs (from Europe, the United States, the 
CIS, and South America). In the case of the ONO Lovosil'skoe, the contract signed with the Tula 
FPI is a yearly contract which set the price of milk at 8 Rubles per kilogram (i.e. 0.19 Euro per 
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Kilogram) for year 2009.
The contract with the factory is only a trade contract. However, it allows ONO Lovosil'skoe to have 
a patrimonial relationship with the owners of plots of land. Indeed, Lovosil'skoe gives the benefit 
of its commercial contract with the Tula factory to the household plots, enabling them to sell their 
production to the factory, while without the 918 tons of milk of the independent corporate farm, the 
factory would not come to take the milk of the small producers. In fact, the ONO Lovosil'skoes 
obliges the factory to set a single price for the milk. We used the word of ³krysa´ (krysa means roof 
in Russian) to name the protective role played by the corporate farm for the household plots. This 
term makes reference, in the business field, to all the knowledge and the organizations which are 
able to ensure, secure and stabilize business environment in a particularly highly corrupted context.  
Generally speaking the corporate independent farms sell their outputs thanks to the FPIs. But, the 
latter concentrate on importing foreign products to get their supplies (especially for meat). In 
contrast to the private agroholdings behavior models, the Tula factory does not enter in a 
patrimonial relationship with the corporate independent farm. It is the independent corporate farm 
who enters in patrimonial relationship with the household plots by letting them benefit from its 
commercial contracts with the factory.
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Box No. 1: Typology of the corporate farms according to their relationships with investors
Through both the productive configurations of ³private agroholdings´ and ³independent corporate farms ± FPI´, we are 
able to give a representation of the transition of 90 % of the former kolkhozes and former sovkhozes of the Orel  Oblast' 
(the remaining 10 % concern farms integrated into public agroholding or those we were not able to determine the nature 
of the subordination). The graph bellow represent the nature of the relationships between investors and corporate farms. 
The X axis represents the nature of the contract signed between a farm and its investor/partner. When the commercial 
relationship is set within a hierarchical model (with acquisition of holdings in the share capital of the corporate farm by 
the investor/partner) we use the term integration. In association with this term, we use the term of "pseudo contract" to 
name contracts between the integrated corporate farms and agroholding partners but at a price which isn't market 
determined. On the other end of the axis we use the term "Commercial contract" to characterize the commercial 
relationship between FPIs and independent corporate farms, based on market economy.
The Y axis characterizes the social and/or commercial commitments undertaken by the investor. 
The graph underlines an important result of this article, which is the relationship that exists between the degree of 
integration and nature of the social commitments undertaken by the oligarchs. In the Orel Oblast', the takeover of the 
corporate farms by oligarchs leaded to the financing of collective goods. 
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3.4 The productive configuration of individual farmers
In the category of the individual farmers we include farmers and owners of plots who have a 
commercial activity independent of public or private agroholdings and of independent corporate 
farms. It is impossible to give the exact number of individual farmers in the Orel region. In fact, the 
official data records the number of farmers and household plots but do not specify which ones 
among them chose to join agroholdings and those who stayed independent. But, the concentration 
of corporate farms in the hands of oligarchs is not without consequence on the strategic choices 
brought by the individual farms of Orel. 
We interviewed twenty-five farmers and household plot owners with a clear commercial 
orientation. Of those twenty-five, only three sold their production themselves on a physical market 
where they have a dedicated stand. All others sold their production by means of middlemen; a 
choice that can be considered as an opportunity to get markets without having to manage too many 
relationships (commercial or patrimonial) on their own either with public or private agroholdings 
and/or FPIs. Middlemen are at the core of the commercial strategy for individual farmers. An 
economist from Orel we questioned on this subject made the following statements: 
I would like to discuss with you the specific situation of the individual 
farmers. During interviews with them, I asked how they sold their produce. 
Most of farmers told me that they resorted to middlemen to sell their 
production. How do you explain the success of the middlemen?
Usually, the middlemen are traders. 
But is there any link with an agroholding? 
No, not usually. 
Then, they are only...
Parasites
Why parasites? 
Because they buy products at a lower price than market price. But I admit to 
being a little sarcastic. Middlemen come to farms and take the products to 
ensure they get sold. It is already a very good thing for the farmers, as they 
lack information concerning the outlet places while these middlemen know 
it. I cannot say that they are indeed parasites, because they play an important 
role: they put farmers¶ produce on an asymmetric market. If the farmers had 
enough knowledge about how the markets work, they would not need to 
resort to these middlemen. But, as it is not the case, the middlemen clear up 
the difficulty of the asymmetric information.
After the produce is sold to the middleman, individual farmers know nothing about the 
transformation process of their produce. We interpret this situation as both an institutional 
arrangements and a strategic choice of the individual farmers to avoid direct competition with other 
farmers. The individual farmers won't be able to look for outlets by themselves because of the 
competition with the agroholdings whose high level of production is far more interesting than the 
low ones of individual farms for the FPI. 
Yet, the individual farmers are not excluded from any patrimonial relationship especially with the 
community of landowners. They are able to produce because of land contracts they have signed 
with the landowners from the local communities. They give part of their produce to the landowners, 
collective goods and even employment in return for the right to cultivate their plots. This is an 
explanatory factor as to why individual farms have lower labor productivity than corporate farms. 
The commercial independence of the small producers depends on the patrimonial relationship they 
establish with the rural community. 
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4. THE TERRITORIAL REGULATION OF THE FOUR PRODUCTIVE 
CONFIGURATIONS 
The identification of the four productive configurations tells us that legal, economic and financial 
situations of farms are very diversified in the Orel Oblast'. However, the integration of the farms 
into one of the four productive configurations never draws them completely away from market 
competition. Actually, the competition is generally transferred from the agricultural market to the 
food processing market. As consequence, competition does not take place between farms 
themselves but between the four types of productive configurations. The lack of food specialization 
in the public agroholding; the choice of the private agroholdings and FPIs to produce similar 
foodstuffs (with fast return on investment) leads to high competition within this market with 
advantages and drawbacks for each configuration. Only the strategy of the individual farms 
consisting of selling to middlemen seems to keep small producers away from this competition.
In this context, the specific characteristics of multifunctionality for the public and private 
agroholdings  generates an over-cost compared to the costs supported by the FPIs, the later having 
only commercial relationship with the independent corporate farms and benefiting from 
"subsidized" prices for imported goods from Europe or the United States. 
We are now going to describe the regulation as it has been developed in the Orel Oblast' to allow 
preservation and development of each of the four productive configurations.
4.1 The regulation of the meat market
The first regulation concerns the meat market, and specifically the poultry and pork markets. 
Because poultry and pork benefit from fast return on investment, they are the preferred produce of
private agroholdings.
In 2003,the Russian Parliament passed a law establishing quotas and contingents for meat imports. 
This decision was due to the increase in these imports the 1998 financial crisis, which was increased 
by the FPI in an attempt to reduce their foodstuff production costs.
On the contrary, Russian producers (particularly the leaders of the agroholdings) pushed the Russian 
government to take measures to protect the national market (HERVÉ 2007). That is why the 
regulation of the meat market has been set as a double protection: a system of quota on poultry 
imports since 2003 and a tariff contingent system for beef and the pork since 2006. It is relevant to 
note that the production of private agroholdings principally consists of poultry, which explains, in 
our opinion, why the poultry market was the first market to benefit from a quota. These 
protectionist rules seem to have had good consequences for the agroholdings declares the director of 
the Migratorg agroholding: 
Did Miratorg take care of the pig breeding thanks to the introduction of 
import quotas?
It is an essential factor which encouraged us to invest in the agricultural 
sector. For us, this was a sign that the government had come from campaign 
promises to concrete actions, and supported Russian production. To enable 
fast replacement of the meat import by national production, it began by the 
fastest market in terms of ROIs: poultry farming. Then, the government 
favored the development of pig breeding as well.3
The system of quota and tariff contingents seems to be an instrument of protection of national 
production mainly defended by directors of private agroholdings. 
In the Orel region, the quota system also brought a new clean sheet in terms of food security 
                                               
3 Agroinvestor n°5 may 2009, downloaded may 5th 2011, http://www.agro-investor.ru/issue/69/3128/
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policies. Carried by the devaluation of the Ruble which followed the 1998 crisis, the Orel regional 
administration knows how to take advantage of the renewed interest of the oligarchs in the 
agricultural sector and how to encourage new investments. Since 2003, the quota system has 
become an additional instrument in territorial promotion of farming activities. Table 2 reports the 
evolution of poultry production. 
Table 2: Poultry production in the Orel Oblast' (tons) according to the category of farms
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Farmers 17 34 42 39 48 38
% of the regional 
production 0.33 0.48 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.28
Plot of land 2700 3300 4200 4600 4900 4600
% of the regional 
production 52.77 46.91 43.56 42.05 34.88 33.73
(independent or 
integrated) 
Corporate farms  2400 3700 5400 6300 9100 9000
% of the regional 
production 46.9 52.6 56 57.59 64.78 65.99
Source: ROSSTAT (2007a: 22), ROSSTAT (2007b: 20) and ROSSTAT (2008: 30)
In the Orel Oblast', the share of poultry production in the farms rose from 47 % in 2001 to 66 % in 
2006. Although the production of small producers also increased, their share in the regional 
production decreased between 2001 and 2006, from 53% to 34% as the global volume of 
production exploded. This data reveals the development of the poultry production trend in the 
corporate farms. With the help of information collected from the corporate farms of the Orel 
Oblast', we can state that five corporate farms produce all the poultry of the corporate farms
category, which equates to 8,074 tons of poultry meat in 2007. 
These five corporate farms are: the OAO Orlovskij Brojler (which belongs to agroholding Belyj 
Fregat, see Table 1), OAO Orlovskij Lider (which belongs to agroholding AMS-Agro, see Table 1). 
These two farms produce 7,643 tons of poultry meat, i.e. 95 % of the regional poultry production by 
corporate farms. Third place goes to ZAO Berezki with 290 tons in 2007 (we were not able to 
determine the productive configuration of this farm, so we can't tell if it is independent or not) and 
fourth place belongs to the ZAO Pticefabrika Orlovskaâ agroholding, which is integrated within the 
regional agroholding Orlovskaâ Niva (134 tons). Finally, in fifth place comes a corporate farm of 
which we ignore the productive configuration, and thus its dependence status. None of the 
independent corporate farms identified have participated in the production of poultry meat in the 
Orel Oblast'. To our knowledge, the production of poultry meat appears to be a specific product of 
the corporate farms owned by agroholdings.
4.2 The credit market 
Another market allows the agroholdings to benefit from a competitive advantage compared with the 
FPIs. It is the credit market. The ³national priority project for the development of the food-
processing industry´ set up a three-tier financing system in 2006:
(1) A support for animal breeding, which aimed to increase the production of meat and milk 
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respectively by 7% and 4.5% during period 2006-2007 thanks to preferential loans ;
(2) Subsidies to the small producers in the form of loans and technical support;
(3) Access to housing in the rural areas for the young graduates of the agrarian universities.
An analysis of the Orel regional budget reveals a positive global evolution of subsidies for the 
corporate farms since 2006. Yet, an analysis of grant allocations shows that it is mostly the 
integrated corporate farms that benefit from these subsidies. This is a list of the main subsidies and 
grants beneficiary in 2006 in the Orel Oblast': the OOO Znamenskij SGC companies (for the 
purchase of 290 pigs), the OOO MTS-Zmievka (for the construction of a pig breeding facility), the 
OAO Agrofirme Livenskoe Mâso (for the reconstruction of a cow breeding facility), the OAO 
Plemzavod Sergievskij, and the OAO APK Orlovskaâ Niva (for the construction of a new poultry 
farm). All of these corporate farms are owned by private agroholdings with the exception of the 
APK Orlovskaâ Niva which belongs to the regional agroholding. 
5. DISCUSSION
The productive configurations are organized in a different way. The public agroholding chose to 
integrate very heterogeneous farmers (farms, household plots, farmers). Rather than specializing in 
a type of production, the managers of Orlovskâ Niva preferred to specialize in producing higher-
valued products through the integration of processing plants and market halls. Its production is 
linked to the consumption of the regions inhabitants (bread, meat, vegetables, etc.). The productive 
configuration established by the oligarchs concentrated on high value-added products (by 
integrating all elements of the value chain from producing to selling foodstuffs). On the contrary, 
the independent corporate farms signed commercial contracts with the FPI to sell low value-added 
products. Finally, the individual farmers preferred to limit their implication in market competition 
with the other productive configurations by hiring of middlemen. These organizational strategies 
come along with specific commercial and patrimonial relationships in each configuration. We 
summarize these relationships in the Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4: The four productive configurations in the Orel Oblast'
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Public and private agroholdings force the integrated corporate farms to enter into an unfavorable 
commercial relationship. This relationship consists of buying products at prices lower than market 
prices. But at the same time, the agroholdings have a patrimonial relationship with the farming 
communities of workers by supplying them with collective goods. This behavior shows how 
multifunctionality of the corporate farms in the Orel Oblast' organizes but does not prevent the 
managers of the corporate farms conditioning the access of the collective goods to the level of 
productivity of their employees. The difference between private and public agroholdings is put on 
the public agroholdings' interests for the food security issue. 
The independent corporate farms and the FPIs only maintain a commercial relationship, the latter 
buying non-transformed products from farms at market price and selling transformed foodstuffs. 
However, the independent corporate farms play a role of krysa, thus fully assuming the patrimonial 
relationship.
Finally, the small producers enter into an unfavorable commercial relationship with middlemen. 
However, the individual farmers have a patrimonial relationship with the rural community of land 
owners. They are supplying them with a part of their production in return to a land access (Grouiez, 
2008). 
These four productive configurations lead to a regulation of competition, which give priority to the 
oligarchs (owners of the private agroholdings) both in regards of the quota policies and access to 
credits. We interpret this regulation as a mean to preserve institutional hybridization between 
commercial and patrimonial relationships brought by integrated corporate farms.
Without this sectoral regulation the private and public agroholdings would be forced to limit their 
multifunctionality to compete with the factories of the FPI sector. At the same time, their choice to 
be multifunctional can appear as a strategy allowing lobbying and as a move to negotiate access to 
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loans and protective quotas. 
However, this regulation must be analyzed in dynamic terms. Nothing is set permanently as far as 
the four productive configurations are concerned. Their modification depends on the economic 
landscape of an area and the period of time. In the Orel Oblast', ever since oligarchs invested in the 
agricultural sector, a transfer of integrated corporate farms within the agroholding Orlovskaâ Niva 
towards private agroholdings took place. As a result of this, private agroholding Ûnost bought 
Orlovskaâ Niva in 2010. However, a two years moratorium was signed with the regional 
administration, regarding the restructuration conditions of the former public structure. This tends to 
prove that the regional administration is not inclined to completely give up on the food security role 
that was performed by Orlovskaâ Niva.
6 CONCLUSION
We identified four cohabiting ³productive configurations´ thanks to regulation in the agricultural 
sector of the Orel oblast'. The first one has been developed by the Orel government: The 
government emphasizes food security and the zoning of the region by controlling some corporate 
farms and private farmers. The second productive configuration was developed by new operators. 
In this configuration two elements are linked together: the financing of some collective goods 
(primary schools, housing, etc) by the farmers in return for the favorable regulation of the food 
market by the regional and national authorities. This regulation comes in the form of quotas on meat 
importation or on facility access to credit for the oligarch in the Orel oblast' The third ³productive 
configuration´ enables the development of two types of farms: independent ex-kolkhozes/ex-
sovkhozes and plots of land. In this configuration, the independent farms find new outlets into the 
food-industry and help owners of plots of land to get contracts with industrial operators. This type 
of compromise guarantees the fulfillment of the local population's basic needs. The fourth 
productive configuration helps to expand the activity of private farmers: They sign contracts with 
³speculant´ (middleman) to guarantee outlets for their products, avoiding direct competition with 
corporate farms and food-industry. This configuration is also dependent on the land contract that the 
private farmer signs with collective-landowners. Private farmers provide the collectivity of 
landowners with outputs from their plots of land in exchange for rental land.
Indeed; each productive configuration is a result of strategies led by farmers in a highly competitive 
context. These strategies concern the multifunctional farm practices. The level of social investments 
for farmers differs across productive configuration. For instance, the farmers involve in the 
productive configuration of the food processing industry do not finance any social welfare for rural 
population (but, as we just mentioned it, help owners of plot of land to sign contracts with food-
industry). On the other side, the farms integrated into private agroholding have special funds to 
finance social policies for rural area. In the same time, the multifunctional farm practices seem to be 
a determinant of the public regulation of the agricultural sector in Russia. In consequence, social 
policies of farms cannot be separated from their economic development strategies.
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